De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions by Cameron, Angela et al.
Canadian Journal of Family Law 
Volume 26 
Number 1 Rethinking Assisted Conception 
2010 





Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/can-j-fam-l 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben, and Fiona Kelly, "De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: Some 
Doubts and Directions" (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 95. 
The University of British Columbia (UBC) grants you a license to use this article under the Creative Commons 
Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) licence. If you wish to use this 
article or excerpts of the article for other purposes such as commercial republication, contact UBC via the 
Canadian Journal of Family Law at cdnjfl@interchange.ubc.ca 
 
 
DE-ANONYMISING SPERM DONORS IN 
CANADA:  SOME DOUBTS AND 
DIRECTIONS  
 
Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben,* and Fiona Kelly** 
 
Abstract: This paper addresses whether sperm donor 
anonymity should continue in Canada and what the effects 
might be of abolishing anonymity, particularly for 
marginalized groups such as lesbian mothers. The first part of 
the paper outlines the legislative and historical context 
surrounding the donor anonymity debate in Canada. The 
second part of the paper addresses the interests of the various 
social and legal stakeholders, including donor conceived 
offspring, the social and biological parents of those offspring, 
and sperm donors. The final segment outlines a twofold law 
reform agenda. First, it is proposed that Canada prospectively 
abolish donor anonymity in an effort to meet the health and 
psychological needs of donor conceived children. Second, it is 
recommended that legal parentage laws be simultaneously 
amended so that the legal vulnerabilities women-led families 
currently experience, and which would be exacerbated by the 
de-anonymizing of donors, are removed. 
  
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
At present, Canadian law permits sperm donor anonymity. 
What this means is that donor conceived offspring cannot know 
the identity of their donor and their donor cannot know the 
identity of any offspring born as a result of their donations. 
                                                 
*  Assistant Professors, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. We 
would like to thank our research assistant Sindura Dar for her work. 
**  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. 
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Offspring also do not have access to updated medical 
information pertaining to their donor. While the majority of 
donated sperm used by prospective parents in Canada falls into 
the category of “anonymous”, also available are what are 
referred to as “identity release” or “open ID” donors. Identity 
release donors have agreed to allow identifying information to 
be provided to donor offspring when the offspring reach the 
age of majority. Identity release donors are, however, far less 
common in Canada than completely anonymous donors and 
this option has only become available in the last few years.  
 
Whether sperm donor anonymity should remain the 
predominant law of Canada, or whether we should move to a 
system of compulsory identity release donors or even 
retroactive de-anonymisation, are questions Canadians have 
struggled with for many years. The issue has become more 
pressing recently for a number of reasons. First, more and more 
Canadians, whether they be heterosexual couples, same-sex 
couples, or single women, are using assisted reproduction 
technologies (“ARTs”) that require donated sperm to create 
their families.1 Second, there is a growing emphasis on the use 
of family and genetic history in the prevention and treatment of 
disease.2 This, in turn, is increasing the emphasis on biological 
                                                 
1  In 2005 2, 687 AHR cycles resulted in a live birth: “Hope, Health and 
Safety: 2007-2008 Annual Report,” Assisted Human Reproduction 
Canada, online: Assisted Human Reproduction Canada 
<http://www.ahrc-pac.gc.ca>. While in 2006 12,052 ART cycles 
resulted in live births: 2005 and 2006 Art Reports, online: The 
Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society <http://www.cfason 
line.ca>. This is consistent with the global trends which illustrate a 25 
percent increase in ART cases between 2000 and 2002 with 
approximately 250,000 live births in 2002: Will Boggs, “Assisted 
Reproduction Rates Increasing Worldwide” Reuters (4 June 2009), 
online: Reuters  <http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUST 
RE5536KG20090604>. 
2  Josephine Johnston, “Mum’s the Word: Donor Anonymity in 
Assisted Reproduction” 11 Health L. Rev. 51 at 53 [Johnston]. 




connections and the desire to know one’s biological 
progenitors. Third, a number of provinces have amended their 
adoption legislation to permit retroactive disclosure of adoption 
records once the adoptee has reached the age of majority.3  The 
shift towards retroactive identity disclosure in the adoption 
context has prompted Canadians to question ongoing 
anonymity in the context of sperm donation. Finally, a recent 
class action suit filed in British Columbia challenging the 
destruction of sperm donor records as well as donor anonymity 
more broadly, Pratten v. Attorney General of B.C. and the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of B.C.,4 has brought 
significant public attention to the issue. Over the next few 
years, the Pratten litigation will force the Canadian courts to 
address the appropriateness of donor anonymity for the first 
time. 
 
In this paper, we address whether donor anonymity 
should continue in Canada and what the effects of abolishing 
anonymity might be, particularly for marginalized groups such 
as lesbian mothers. De-anonymisation is typically understood 
                                                 
3  See, for example, Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5, ss. 58-74 [B.C. 
Adoption Act]; Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 11, ss. 
145.1-145.2; Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter v.4, ss. 48.3-
48.7. Ontario's new disclosure provisions came into force on 1 June 
2009. 
4  Unreported judgment, 28 October 2008 [Pratten]. In this case the 
plaintiff successfully sought an injunction preventing any changes to 
or destruction of donor sperm records in British Columbia. She is a 
26 year old donor conceived woman whose only information about 
her sperm donor consists of his basic physical characteristics. The 
remainder of Pratten's claim argues violations of both s. 7 and s. 15 of 
the Charter. The plaintiff argues that donor conceived offspring are 
treated differently from those who are adopted.  Donor conceived 
offspring cannot access medical, social, or identifying information 
pertaining to their donor, unlike adopted children when they reach the 
age of majority.  
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to permit donor conceived offspring, and possibly donors, to 
access identifying information about each other once the 
offspring reach the age of majority. If applied retroactively, it 
would permit identity disclosure in situations where both the 
intending parents and donor had operated under an expectation 
of complete anonymity. While the abolition of donor 
anonymity could take a number of forms, the majority of those 
advocating for it seek complete and retroactive disclosure. The 
first part of the paper outlines the legislative and historical 
context surrounding the donor anonymity debate in Canada. 
The second part addresses the interests of the various social 
and legal stakeholders, including donor conceived offspring, 
the social and biological parents of those offspring, and sperm 
donors. In this section we argue that while de-anonymising 
sperm donors may provide some benefits to donor conceived 
offspring, to make such a change, particularly if retroactive, 
without first providing adequate legal protections for women-
led families – lesbian families and those headed by single 
mothers by choice – is likely to create significant 
vulnerabilities. The article concludes by outlining a twofold 
law reform agenda. First, we propose that Canada 
prospectively abolish donor anonymity in an effort to meet the 
health and psychological needs of donor-conceived children. 
Second, we recommend that legal parentage laws be 
simultaneously amended so that the legal vulnerabilities 
women-led families currently experience, and which would be 
exacerbated by the de-anonymisation of donors, are removed.  
 
Although both sperm and egg donation raise many 
comparable legal concerns, because there are significant 
gendered differences between the two practices they warrant 
individualized attention.5 Due to these differences, this paper 
addresses sperm donation only.6  
                                                 
5  There are two reasons for this division of gametes; both implicate 
important gendered differences between egg and sperm donation. 
First, a full analysis of ova donation will require an examination of 




THE HISTORY OF SPERM DONOR  
ANONYMITY IN CANADA 
 
In March 2006 the federal government introduced the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act (the “AHRA”),7 which governs many 
aspects of assisted human reproduction, including sperm donor 
anonymity. This legislation, however, was preceded by two 
decades of public debate and government inquiries exploring, 
in part, issues related to sperm donation and the question of 
anonymity. In the discussion below, we describe these debates 
in some detail, as they highlight the variable public and 
government positions on sperm donor anonymity that have 
been considered to date in Canada. 
                                                                                               
reproductive technologies such as surrogacy, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. As feminists we begin our analysis from the 
reproductive autonomy of women, and would wish to deal 
extensively with the gendered implications of ova donation. Second, 
from the perspective of women’s health, the process of egg donation 
is significantly more onerous and dangerous than sperm donation. 
Sperm retrieval is a relatively easy process and involves no direct 
medical intervention. In contrast, ova retrieval is a difficult and 
painful medical procedure which carries with it several serious side 
effects. The egg donor must undergo hormone treatments and the ova 
must be surgically retrieved from her ovaries. There are significant 
risks associated with both the hormone stimulation and the retrieval, 
the most serious being ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome. A 
separate paper taking into account the implications of these gendered 
health risks is warranted. 
6  In fact, the Royal Commission on Reproductive Technologies 
concluded that these processes were not parallel and made different 
recommendations with respect to each: Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, Proceed with Care: Final Report of the 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Minister of 
Government Services Canada, 1993) at 588 [Commission].  This 
paper also does not address donated embryos and the questions 
arising from their use in assisted human reproduction procedures. 
7  Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 [AHRA]. 
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Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
(1989)  
 
In 1989, the federal government created the Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies (the “Commission”) to 
study reproductive technologies and their regulation in Canada. 
The Commission made 293 recommendations, including that 
sperm donation remain anonymous.8 Importantly, the 
Commission concluded that egg and sperm donation are 
different processes which give rise to distinct concerns and, 
accordingly, made different recommendations with respect to 
each.9 Egg donation is significantly more onerous and 
dangerous than sperm donation because ova can only be 
retrieved surgically from a woman’s ovaries.10 Further, the 
difficulties associated with freezing ova means that egg 
donation is generally restricted to fresh ova which results in 
fewer ova and poses greater risk of contracting body-fluid 
borne pathogens, such as HIV.11  
 
The Commission articulated several rationales in 
support of its recommendation to maintain the anonymity of 
sperm donors. First, the Commission was concerned that 
disclosure of the donor’s identity would invade the privacy and 
security of the newly formed family.12 In addition, for those 
who decide to use an anonymous donor as opposed to a known 
                                                 
8  The Commission recommended that identifying information about 
sperm donors remain confidential, supra note 6 at 476 
(Recommendation no. 88).  
9  Ibid. at 588.   
10  Ibid. 
11  Tao Tao & Alfonso De Valle, “Human Oocyte and Ovarian Tissue 
Cyropreservation and its Application” (2008) 25 J. Assist. Reprod. 
Genet. 287. 
12  Supra note 6 at 443. 




donor, and who choose to structure their family in such a way 
as to exclude the donor from the family, erasing donor 
anonymity directly undermines this choice. Second, the 
Commission expressed concern that full disclosure would 
affect the supply of donor sperm because fewer men would be 
willing to donate knowing that offspring could contact them 
later in life.13 The Commission indicated that the ambiguity 
surrounding the legal status of sperm donors—specifically, 
whether donors may be financially or legally responsible for 
their donor conceived offspring—raised significant concerns. 
The Commission indicated that donors were particularly 
concerned that they be protected from the legal responsibilities 
of parenthood.14 Third, the Commission noted that children 
conceived using donor sperm are not unlike many other 
children who do not know the identity of their male progenitor. 
The Commission cited that approximately 6-10% of children 
have no father identified on the birth certificate.15 Further, the 
Commission noted that the likelihood of non-paternity in 
children of heterosexual intimate couples in the general 
population may be as high as 10%.16 
 
The Commission did recognize the donor conceived 
offspring’s interest in receiving information about his or her 
biological progenitor.  In particular, the Commission affirmed 
the importance of donor information to the offspring’s physical 
and psychological well-being. However, the Commission 
ultimately took the position that these considerations were 
outweighed by factors that supported donor anonymity and 
could be met through the disclosure of non-identifying 
information.    
                                                 
13  Ibid. at 444. 
14  Ibid. at 441. 
15  Ibid. at 443. 
16  Ibid. at 441. 
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House of Commons Standing Committee on Health:  
Assisted Human Reproduction (2001) 
 
The question of donor anonymity arose again in 2001 when the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Health (the 
“Standing Committee”) was asked to review a draft version of 
the AHRA. The Standing Committee heard a number of diverse 
perspectives on the issue of donor anonymity. The Standing 
Committee concluded that “where there is a conflict between 
the privacy rights of a donor and the rights of a resulting child 
to know its heritage, the rights of the child should prevail”.17 
Unlike the Royal Commission, the Standing Committee 
recommended that “consent to the release of identifying 
information be mandatory before accepting an individual” as a 
sperm donor.18 However, the Standing Committee did not 
recommend any particular model for de-anonymising sperm 
donation. 
 
THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS 
 
The Assisted Human Reproduction Act:  Preserving Donor 
Anonymity  
 
Despite the Standing Committee’s recommendation that 
donation of sperm be open, the AHRA, passed in 2004, 
preserves the anonymity of donors. It does so by prohibiting 
the disclosure of any identifying information about the donor 
without his consent. However, the AHRA does address some of 
the concerns that arise from donor anonymity, most notably, 
those that relate to the physical and psychological health and 
well-being of the offspring. The AHRA requires the disclosure 
of certain non-identifying information about the donor, 
                                                 
17  House of Commons Standing Committee on Health, “Assisted 
Human Reproduction: Building Families” (December 2001) at 21.  
18  Ibid. at 24.  




including a basic family medical history, information about 
personal characteristics such as hair colour, eye colour, height, 
weight, etc. to the person undergoing the assisted human 
reproduction procedures,19 as well as to the donor-conceived 
offspring20 and his or her descendants.21  
 
The Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada 
(the “Agency”) is responsible for much of the disclosure of 
non-identifying information about the donor to the donor- 
conceived offspring.22 The Agency is charged with creating 
and maintaining a registry of personal health information of (1) 
donors; (2) individuals undergoing assisted human 
reproduction procedures; and (3) those conceived using AHR 
procedures.23 The registry will be used for several purposes in 
addition to providing non-identifying information to the donor-
conceived offspring. One of the most important functions of 
the registry will be to ensure that individuals who know or 
suspect they were conceived using ARTs will be able to 
determine whether they are biologically related to another 
person by making an application with that person to the 
Agency.24 This is designed to prevent donor offspring from 
mistakenly engaging in intimate relations with partners who are 




                                                 
19  Supra  note 7, s. 15(4). 
20  Ibid., s. 18(3).  
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid.   
23  Ibid., s. 17. Given that the majority of sperm used by intending 
parents in Canada is imported from the United States, this registry 
may be of limited practical utility.  
24  Ibid., s. 18(4). 
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The Pratten Litigation:  Challenging Donor Anonymity  
 
Following the introduction of the AHRA in 2004, donor 
anonymity has become well established in Canadian law. 
However, the practice has recently come under threat as a 
result of class action litigation challenging the constitutionality 
of maintaining anonymity.25 In Pratten, the plaintiff, a donor 
conceived adult, is challenging the constitutionality of 
preserving donor anonymity in the context of assisted human 
reproduction. The case alleges two distinct constitutional 
violations. First, Pratten argues that the destruction of medical 
records pertaining to donor conception, as required by 
provincial regulations, violates the donor-conceived offspring’s 
right to security of the person protected by section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms26 (the “Charter”) . 
Pratten argues that this right is violated because the records are 
not available to the offspring in circumstances of medical 
necessity, such as when it is required to safeguard his or her 
physical or psychological health. Pratten argues that this 
violation is not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice because it is arbitrary, irrational, 
disproportionate, under-inclusive, and contrary to the duty of 
the state to reasonably accommodate certain persons with 
disabilities.  
 
The second constitutional violation Pratten alleges 
relates to British Columbia’s Adoption Act27  (the “Adoption 
Act”) and its regulations. She argues that the B.C. Adoption Act 
contravenes section 15 of the Charter because, unlike for 
adopted offspring, it fails to include a process whereby donor-
                                                 
25  Ms. Pratten’s statement of claim can be accessed online: Arvay 
FinlayBarristers <http://www.arvayfinlay.com/news/Writ%20of% 
20Summons%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim.pdf> 
26  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q c. C-12. 
27  B.C. Adoption Act, supra note 3.  




conceived offspring can learn the identity of their donor once 
they reach the age of majority. In other words, it treats adopted 
offspring and donor-conceived offspring differently.  
 
In October 2008, Pratten was successful in securing an 
injunction to prevent the destruction of any existing records, 
including those that might pertain to her own conception. As of 
April, 2010, the case had not yet been heard. 
 
Although Pratten's lawsuit does not squarely engage 
the provisions of the AHRA which protect donor anonymity, if 
successful, the case will certainly have an impact on them. In 
addition, the case has already attracted significant media 
attention and is likely to continue to do so. As a result, the 
question of donor anonymity will likely be near the top of 
Parliament’s agenda when it undertakes a review of the AHRA, 
which is required by law later this year.28 Given the often 
emotive nature of the public debate, it is of vital importance 
that the legal effects of abolishing donor anonymity be 
analyzed with care.  
 
Legal Parentage in the Context of Assisted Conception  
 
While the AHRA provides a comprehensive framework 
governing the disclosure of information about donors and 
donor-conceived offspring, the legal status of donors, if any, 
with regard to the families who use their sperm to conceive 
remains unaddressed. Legal parentage is the domain of 
provincial governments, yet few provinces have addressed the 
issue via legislation. Those that have are inconsistent in the 
approach they have taken. As a result, the extent of a sperm 
donor’s rights and responsibilities, if any, vis-à-vis donor-
conceived offspring are uncertain. Is the donor responsible for 
child support? Does the donor have a right to contact or access 
the offspring? How do the rules of intestacy apply? These 
                                                 
28  Supra note 7, s. 70.  
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uncertainties have aggravated existing concerns about the 
abolition of donor anonymity. If anonymity is to end, the law 
needs to be clear about the donor's legal status. 
 
The few provinces that have enacted legislation 
addressing the legal status of sperm donors explicitly state that 
a man who donates sperm does not enjoy any legal status as a 
parent vis-á-vis the offspring. For example, Alberta's Family 
Law Act29 provides that a sperm donor who is not in a 
“relationship of interdependence of some permanence” with a 
female person has no legal status as a parent to offspring 
conceived using his sperm. Similarly, in Quebec, the 
contribution of genetic material for the purposes of a third 
party “parental project” does not create any bond of filiation or 
parental relationship between the donor and the offspring 
conceived there from.30 In both provinces, the legislation 
applies to both heterosexual and same-sex couples who achieve 
conception via ARTs. 
 
By contrast, a man who is not the biological progenitor 
of offspring conceived using ARTs may acquire status as a 
legal parent under certain circumstances. For example, in 
Alberta, a man may qualify as a legal parent if, at the time of 
an assisted conception, he was the spouse of or in a relationship 
of interdependence of some permanence with the woman who 
gave birth to the offspring and he consented to the reproductive 
procedure.31 In Quebec, there is a presumption that the spouse 
                                                 
29  Family Law Act S.A., c. F-4.5, s.13(3).  
30  Art. 538.2 C.C.Q. While not explicitly defined, a “parental project” 
involving assisted procreation "exists from the moment a person 
alone decides or spouses by mutual consent decide, in order to have a 
child, to resort to the genetic material of a person who is not party to 
the parental project:" Art. 538 C.C.Q. The civil code applies to 
filiation rules only where the donation does not occur through sexual 
intercourse. 
31  Family Law Act, supra note 29. 




of the woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s other 
parent, providing the individuals are party to a “parental 
project”. However, this presumption can be rebutted in several 
situations.32 Similar statutory provisions exist in Newfoundland 
and Labrador,33 Nova Scotia,34 and the Yukon.35 
 
A small number of provinces have explicitly addressed 
the parental status of non-biological mothers in lesbian-led 
families created via ARTs, extending the same protection to 
them as they do to non-biological fathers. For example, 
Quebec’s Civil Code explicitly provides that where both 
parents are women, the rights and obligations assigned by law 
to the father, are assigned to the mother who did not give birth 
to the child.36 However, as discussed below, Quebec courts 
have granted a known sperm donor the rights and obligations 
of a father even where both members of a lesbian couple 
appeared to acquire parental status under the legislation and 
                                                 
32  Art. 538.3 C.C.Q. The presumption applies where the child is born 
during the marriage, the civil union or within 300 days of its 
dissolution or annulment.   
33  A sperm donor will not be considered the legal father of a child where 
his semen is used to artificially inseminate a woman to whom he is 
not married or with whom he is not cohabiting at the time of the 
insemination: Children’s Law Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, s. 12(6) 
[CLA].  A man whose semen is used to artificially inseminate a 
woman to whom he is married or with whom he is cohabiting is 
considered in law to be the father of the child: CLA, s. 12 (2). 
Similarly, a man whose semen is not used to artificially inseminate a 
woman to whom he is married or cohabiting where he consents in 
advance to the artificial insemination is considered in law to be the 
father of the child: CLA, ss. 12(3) and (4). 
34  Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, s. 3(1) [Birth 
Registration Regulations (see next page)].   
35  Children’s Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 31, s. 13.  
36  Art. 539.1 C.C.Q. 
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intended to exclude the known sperm donor from the family 
unit.37 In Nova Scotia, the Birth Registration Regulations states 
that where a child is conceived through ARTs, the spouse of 
the mother is the child’s other parent.38 The use of the gender 
neutral term “spouse” appears to extend recognition to either a 
female or male partner.  
 
The dearth of legislation in Canada addressing the 
parentage of children born via sperm donation is a significant 
concern for those who are already unsure about the merit of 
abolishing donor anonymity. Without clear parentage laws in 
place for families who conceive using ARTs, it is not obvious 
who the child’s legal parents might be. Families are justifiably 
concerned that, without the protection of the law, donors might 
intervene in their established relationships and pose a threat to 
their family security. Lesbian families have reason to be 
particularly concerned given how few provinces protect the 
parentage of non-biological mothers. Single mothers by choice 
are also vulnerable to donor intervention given that the absence 
of a second parent.  
 
EQUALITY CONCERNS AND SPERM DONATION 
 
Both preserving the status quo (sperm donor anonymity) and 
de-anonymising donors once a child reaches the age of 
majority raise a number of questions. What are the 
consequences of de-anonymising donation? What is in the best 
interests of the offspring? How do we protect and promote 
Canadian families? In the next section we will discuss some of 
these issues, addressing the interests of each of the stakeholder 
groups: (a) donor-conceived offspring; (b) those who use donor 
sperm, focusing in particular on the unique vulnerabilities of 
women-led families; (c) donors; and, (d) prospective parents. 
                                                 
37  Infra notes 84 and 86. 
38  Supra note 35. 




The Rights and Interests of the Donor-Conceived Child  
 
Much of the debate around de-anonymising sperm donors 
centers on the right of donor offspring to know their genetic 
origins. “Knowing ones genetic origins” is defined variably to 
include a right to access health and psychosocial information, 
to know the identity of the gamete donor, or even to meet and 
form a relationship with the donor. This “right” is not without 
critique. For example, the right to know one’s genetic origins 
has been criticized by feminist scholars on the basis that it 
promotes genetic essentialism. They argue that in countries that 
have de-anonymized sperm donors “children may attempt to 
find their ‘parents’ not necessarily because of a ‘natural’ desire 
to know their origins, but because such a desire is constructed, 
recognized and legitimized by the law”.39 In this section we 
address the rights and interests of donor conceived offspring, 
focusing on their physical and psychological health needs as 
well as the legal mechanisms they have drawn on to support 
their claims.  
 
Knowledge of one’s family and genetic history is 
increasingly important in the prevention and treatment of 
disease. This is certainly true for diseases that are linked to 
specific genes, such as Huntington’s disease, or the association 
between the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene and breast cancer.40 
One’s family medical history is also arguably important in 
making day-to-day health decisions. For example, if there is a 
family history of colon cancer, a person may decide to have a 
                                                 
39  Ilke Turkmendag, Robert Dingwall, & Therese Murphy, “The 
Removal of Donor Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by 
Would-be Parents” (2008) Int’l J. of Law, Policy and the Family 283 
at 291. 
40   A mutation in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene is the most commonly 
detectable cause of hereditary breast cancer: Mark Robson & Kenneth 
Offit, “Management of an Inherited Predisposition to Breast Cancer” 
(2007) 357 N. Engl. J. Med. 154.  
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colonoscopy at an earlier age. Since genetic information is 
considered an important tool in the prevention and treatment of 
disease, this tends to be the most frequently invoked and 
readily accepted argument in support of abolishing sperm 
donor anonymity.41 De-anonymisation is considered by some to 
be the most effective way to gain access to this information. 
However, alternatives that do not involve de-anonymisation are 
available, such information registries like the one provided for 
in the AHRA.42  
 
The right to know one’s genetic origins is also 
considered by some to be vital to donor offspring’s 
psychological health.43  At least two types of psychological 
harm to offspring have been identified. First, it is argued that 
donor-conceived offspring may suffer psychological damage as 
a result of the presence of a secret being kept in the home. 
                                                 
41  Johnston, supra note 2 at 52. 
42  Many of these health concerns will be addressed by privacy and 
access to information provisions of the AHRA, which are not yet in 
force. See Vanessa Gruben, “Assisted Reproduction Without 
Assisting Over-Collection: Fair Information Practices and the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada” (2009) 27 Health 
Law Journal 229 [Gruben]. Practically speaking, for many decades 
preceding the coming into force of these provisions, families and 
offspring have received significant non-identifying information about 
their donor including family history, health, and genetic information 
about the donor, robust physical descriptions, and in some cases 
social information such as favourite colour, hobbies, photographs of 
the donor in child and adulthood, and essays about why they donated 
sperm. 
43  Professor Michelle Giroux, “Should Egg and Sperm Donors Remain 
Anonymous?” (Paper presented at Public Panel Discussion on 
Gamete Donor Anonymity, March 26th, 2009, University of Ottawa 
Faculty of Law) [unpublished] [Giroux]; Michelle Dennison, 
“Revealing Your Sources: The Case for Non-Anonymous Sperm 
Donation” (2007-08) 21 J.L. & Health 1 at 16. 




Much research has been done in the context of adoption 
concerning the harm that is inflicted on children as a result of 
keeping secrets.44 A similar argument is raised in the context of 
donor offspring, who face similar psychological burdens if they 
discover that their biological identity has been kept a secret by 
their intending parents.45 The problem identified by this 
argument is not with anonymity; rather, it is with parents who 
are not honest with their children about the nature of their 
conception. Although de-anonymisation may prompt more 
parents to be open with their donor conceived children, a more 
effective solution would be to either require or encourage 
parents to disclose to their children that they are donor-
conceived. An increasing number of fertility clinics are 
counseling parents to do so, though the rates of disclosure 
remain low within the heterosexual community.46 
 
                                                 
44  Amanda Baden & Mary O’Leary Wiley, “Counselling Adopted 
Persons in Adulthood: Integrating Practice and Research” (2007) 35 
The Counselling Psychologist 868; Marianne Brower Blair, “The 
Impact of Family Paradigms, Family Constitutions, and International 
Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person’s Identities and 
Heritage: A Comparative Examination” (2000-01) 22 Mich. J. Intl 
Law 587. 
45  A. Lalos, C. Gottlieb, & O. Lalos, “Legislated Right for Donor-
Insemination Children to Know Their Genetic Origin: A Study of 
Parental Thinking” (2007) 22 Human Reproduction 1759 at 1766 
[Lalos, Gottlieb & Lalos]. See also: Angela Campbell “Conceiving 
Parents through Law” (2007) 21 International J of Law, Policy & the 
Family 242. 
46    For example, in a study of heterosexual couples from Sweden who 
had conceived via donor insemination, 89% had not informed their 
children: Claes Gottlieb, Othon Lalos, & Frank Lindblad, "Disclosure 
of Donor Insemination to the Child: The Impact of Swedish 
Legislation on Couples’ Attitudes” (2000) 15 Human Reproduction 
2052.  
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The second psychological concern for donor offspring 
is that an inability to access one’s genetic history may result in 
emotional harm because the affected individuals do not have 
access to one half of their “identity”. For some, knowledge of 
one’s biological progenitors is necessary to having a fuller 
sense of one’s own individual identity.47 This may be limited to 
knowledge of social information such as eye colour, height, 
and education, information already provided by the existing 
system in Canada. However, it may also extend to knowing the 
actual identity of the donor and forming a relationship with 
him.48 For those who wish to meet their donor, the abolition of 
anonymity is the only viable option. 
 
Those advocating for the interests of donor offspring, 
including offspring themselves, have raised various legal 
arguments to support their right to know their genetic origins.49 
Many have drawn on international law.50 For example, the right 
to know one’s genetic origins is considered by some to be a 
right protected by several provisions of the UN Convention on 
                                                 
47  A. J. Turner & A. Coyle, “What Does it Mean to be a Donor 
Offspring? The Identity Experiences of Adults Conceived by Donor 
Insemination and the Implications for Counselling and Therapy” 
(2000) 15 Human Reproduction 2041 at 2046. 
48  Ibid. at 2047. 
49  For a discussion of the various rights-based arguments raised in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights, see Giroux, 
supra note 43. 
50  Eric Blyth & Abigail Farrand, “Anonymity in Donor-Assisted 
Conception and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
(2004) The Int’l J. of Children’s Rights 89 at 93 [Blyth & Farrand]; 
Michelle Giroux, “Le droit fondamental de connaître ses origines 
biologiques: impact des droits fondamentaux sur le droit de la 
filiation” (2006) Revue du Barreau / Numéro thématique hors série 
255-294; Lucy Frith “Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical 
and Legal Debate” (2001) 16 Human Reproduction 818 at 820-21. 




the Rights of the Child (the “CRC”).51 These include: Article 3 
(the best interests of the child), Article 7 (the right to know and 
be cared for by one’s parents), Article 8 (respecting the right of 
the child to preserve his or her identity), the Preamble and 
Article 18 (which together require respect for identity, family 
and private life), Article 13 (right to information), and Article 2 
(non-discrimination).  
 
Article 3 of the CRC requires that the best interests of 
the child should be a primary consideration in all actions 
concerning children. Those advocating for de-anonymisation 
have argued that it is in the best interests of children to know 
the identities of their biological progenitors and that this is best 
achieved through the abolition of donor anonymity.52 However, 
Article 3 has also been invoked to support maintaining donor 
anonymity.53 It has been argued that anonymity is, in fact, in 
the best interests of the child. In families where donor offspring 
have been raised by social parents, an overemphasis on 
biological notions of family at the expense of social notions of 
family undermines and diminishes the donor offspring’s social 
family.54 Further, donor anonymity may be in the best interests 
of the child where it protects the offspring from unwanted 
intrusion by the donor, or in circumstances where previously 
anonymous donors express homophobia or racism towards the 
offspring’s social parents or family. Finally, similar disclosure 
rules do not apply to children conceived through heterosexual 
intercourse. Biological mothers may not know, or choose to 
disclose the true male progenitors of their children, for 
numerous reasons. 
                                                 
51  Blyth & Farrand, ibid.  
52  Johnston, supra note 2 at 52. 
53  Blyth & Farrand, supra note 50 at 94. 
54  See Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Infertility and the Parameters 
of Disability Discourse” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Develin Eds., 
Critical Disability Theory (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 295-6. 
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Article 7, the article of the CRC most frequently cited in 
support de-anonymisation, states: 
 
The child shall be registered immediately after 
birth and shall have the right from birth to a 
name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as 
far as possible, the right to know and be cared 
for by his or her parents. 
 
Some member states, such as Austria, have interpreted Article 
7 to give effect to the donor-conceived person’s right to know 
the identity of the donor.55 However, such an interpretation 
depends on how one defines “parents” and whether it 
necessarily includes a genetic connection.56 Non-biological 
lesbian mothers act as parents to their children and are almost 
always recognized as such by the children themselves.57 Thus, 
Article 7 could just as easily be interpreted to protect the 
children of lesbian parents from the intrusion of a donor who is 
no more than a sperm provider. 
 
In Canada, the Pratten litigation has suggested that 
there may be a number of domestic laws that favour de-
anonymisation. As noted above, Pratten argues that the right to 
know one’s genetic origins may be protected by sections 7 and 
15 of the Charter. She alleges that donor anonymity violates 
the security of the person protected by section 7 as it threatens 
the offspring’s physical and psychological health. With regard 
to section 15, Pratten argues that donor anonymity violates the 
equality rights of donor offspring by failing to make available 
to them a process such as that available to adoptees by which 
                                                 
55  Blyth & Farrand, supra note 50 at 94. 
56  Ibid. 
57  A. Brewaeys et al., “Donor Insemination: Child Development and 
Family Functioning in Lesbian Mother Families” (1997) 12 Human 
Reproduction 1349 at 1356 [Brewaeys et al.]. 




they can learn the identity of their donor when they reach the 
age of majority. Given that the case has not yet been heard, it is 
difficult to know how a court might respond to Pratten's 
argument.58 However, should she be successful, the issue then 
becomes how such a process might be managed, including 
what options might be available to both donors and donor 
offspring for lodging vetoes or non-disclosure requests. 
 
While the health and identity-related issues raised by 
donor offspring must be taken seriously, the de-anonymisation 
of sperm donation, particularly if applied retroactively, could 
also lead to several damaging consequences. In the next 
section, we address some of these consequences, focusing on 
the potential impact of de-anonymisation on women-led 
families. 
 
Interests of Canadian Families 
 
Many Canadian families are worried about de-anonymising 
sperm donors. Parents are concerned that the donor will intrude 
into and disrupt the family unit. This concern is aggravated by 
inconsistent legislation regarding the parental status of donors 
and social parents. While there are some commonalities, the 
concerns of heterosexual families are often starkly different 
from women-headed families. The next section describes the 
concerns of lesbian-led and single mother families and the 




                                                 
58  Vanessa Gruben & Daphne Gilbert, “Equality and Security: 
Assessing the Charter Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring” in 
Juliet Guichon, Ian Mitchell, & Michelle Giroux, The Right to Know 
One’s Origins (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press) 
[forthcoming]. 
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The Equality Rights of Women Using Donors:  Lesbian and 
Single Choice  
 
De-anonymising sperm donors creates unique concerns for 
women-headed families that must be addressed before we 
proceed with abolishing or further regulating sperm donor 
anonymity. Women-headed families include lesbian couples as 
well as single women, regardless of sexual orientation, who 
have used an anonymous sperm donor to conceive. While de-
anonymisation is typically understood to permit donor 
conceived offspring, and possibly donors, to access identifying 
information about each other once the offspring reach the age 
of majority, there is a strong movement proposing a complete 
ban on anonymity at any stage.59 This means that women-led 
families are vulnerable to having previously anonymous sperm 
donors inserted into their family against their wishes before 
their children reach the age of majority and choose such a 
relationship themselves. The legal vulnerabilities described 
below may also be exacerbated where the women heading 




                                                 
59  Some donor conceived adults, particularly those who were not 
informed of their origins until later in life, believe donor anonymity 
should be banned altogether. This position is frequently voiced by 
donor conceived adults on the Donor Sibling Registry list-serves and 
has been expressed in published material written by donor conceived 
adults. See, for example, “Narelle’s story” in Heather Grace Jones & 
Maggie Kirkman, eds., Sperm Wars: The Rights and Wrongs of 
Reproduction (Sydney: ABC Books, 2005) 170. 
60  In the context of Canadian family law, women living at the 
intersection of multiple oppressions are more vulnerable to having 
access or custody of their children awarded to fathers or father figures 
against their wishes. See Susan B. Boyd, Child Custody, Law and 
Women’s Work (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003). 






We know that many queer and single mother-led families are 
using ARTs to bring biological children into their families. For 
instance, recent Canadian statistics indicate that 15-20% of 
those using fertility clinics are lesbian women.61  Similar 
statistics have been cited with regard to single women.62 
 
While there are a myriad of queer family forms63 there 
are four basic forms of queer families in Canada that may be 
affected by questions of sperm donor anonymity:  
 
1) A lesbian couple in an intimate relationship who 
conceives using an anonymous sperm donor in a 
fertility clinic setting to conceive and create a “homo-
nuclear” family. 
 
2) A single woman, whether heterosexual or lesbian, who 
conceives using an anonymous sperm donor in a 
                                                 
61  In 2001, an employee of the Genesis Fertility Clinic in Vancouver 
testified before the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal that of the 400 
assisted inseminations the clinic performs each year, 15 to 20 per cent 
are for same-sex couples: Gill and Maher, Murray and Popoff v. 
Ministry of Health, 2001 BCHRT 34. 
62  According to Dr. Sam Batarseh, director of IVF Canada, the number 
of single women coming to him for donor insemination has tripled 
over the last 30 years: Helen Buttery, "The Single Life: Affluent, 
Educated and Autonomous – Why are more Women Enjoying 
Motherhood on their Own?" Elle Canada, online: Elle Canada< 
http://www.ellecanada.com/living/the-single-life/a/24814>.  
63  Including the possibility, at least in Ontario, of a three parent queer 
family. The decision in (A.)A. v. (B.)B., [2007] O.J. No. 2 permitted 
the legal recognition of a family made up of two mothers and a father. 
However, the court made it very clear that the decision was specific 
to the factual circumstances and should not be understood as 
automatically enabling three parent families. 
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fertility clinic to conceive and create a single mother 
family. 
 
3) A lesbian couple in an intimate relationship, or a single 
woman, who conceives using a known sperm donor 
outside of a fertility clinic and forms a parenting 
relationship with the known donor that may give rise 
to legal rights and responsibilities.  
 
4) A lesbian couple in an intimate relationship, or a single 
woman, who conceives using a known sperm donor 
outside of a fertility clinic and forms a non-parenting 
relationship that consists of either limited or no contact 
between donor and child and no intended parenting 
rights on the part of the donor. 
 
The family forms most affected by the de-anonymisation of 
sperm donation are the first two: the “homo-nuclear” family 
and the single mother by choice family created via anonymous 
donation.64 These families have often consciously and 
politically chosen an anonymous sperm donor to avoid the 
legal and parenting complexities that come with using a known 
donor. 
 
The Practical Issues 
 
Anonymous sperm donors are particularly important for 
lesbian-led families for a number of practical reasons, some of 
which also pertain to single mothers by choice. First, there are 
                                                 
64  We recognize that the homonuclear family represents only one part of 
the queer family spectrum, and do not intend to privilege this 
relatively conservative family form. Other queer family forms, 
however, because of their use of known donors, are not as deeply 
affected by de-anonymising sperm donation. 




still provinces where same-sex couples cannot adopt,65 or 
where adopting is difficult,66 making access to ARTs on terms 
agreeable to lesbian-led families a priority. Second, restrictions 
placed on sperm donation by queer donors, the most popular 
choice of donor for lesbian couples, means that without 
anonymous donors, lesbian women are severely restricted in 
their ability to procreate. 67  Men who have had sexual contact 
with other men since 1977, cannot donate sperm at Canadian 
fertility clinics without written consent from Health Canada, 
which involves a lengthy approval process.68 This means that in 
order to conceive with a queer, known donor, single and 
lesbian women face a number of obstacles. First, because these 
women are forced to self-inseminate outside of a fertility clinic 
they do not have access to the sperm screening procedures 
mandated by Health Canada and available to those who use 
                                                 
65  New Brunswick for instance is poised to change their adoption 
legislation to allow for non-biological, same-sex parent adoption: 
Kevin Bissett, “New Brunswick Government to Amend Adoption 
Rules for First Time Since 1980” Canadian Press NewsWire (27 
March 2007), and it is ambiguous as to whether gay men and lesbians 
can adopt in the Yukon: Children’s Act, supra note 36, s. 80. 
66  Lance Anderson and Blair Croft were the first same-sex couple to be 
allowed to adopt in Alberta, following intense resistance from 
provincial child welfare agencies. See Mike Sadava, “Gay Couple 
Leaps ‘Walls’ to Adopt Son” Edmonton Journal (9 February 2007).  
67  See Angela Cameron, “Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act” (2008) 24 Canadian Journal of Family 
Law 101 [Cameron]. 
68  This prohibition was recently upheld in Susan Doe v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2007] O.J. No. 70 (C.A.). There is an exception 
to this rule if the sperm donor is the sexual partner or spouse of the 
woman who wishes to use their donor sperm. This scenario is 
unlikely in the case of a queer man and a lesbian couple or single 
woman. 
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fertility clinics.69 Second, if there is a fertility issue the woman 
has limited access to medical professionals with fertility 
expertise outside of a fertility clinic.  
 
The Social Issues  
 
At a political and social level, lesbian and single mother-led 
families may use anonymous sperm donors to resist the larger 
popular discourse of a child needing a “father” or “father 
figure” in order to thrive.70 Eliminating access to anonymous 
donors raises a challenge to all women-led families who wish 
to parent without a father or father figure. This implicates both 
women's autonomy to parent independently from men as well 
as the right of single women and same-sex couples to form a 
family, a right which has historically been protected for 
heterosexual couples. We argue that both of these socio-
political choices should be vigorously protected under any 
legislative regime eliminating or altering the current sperm 
donor anonymity regime. 
 
The Legal Issues 
 
Perhaps the most significant reason why the de-anonymising of 
sperm donation is a concern for women-led families is that 
                                                 
69  Health Canada Directive: Technical Requirements for Therapeutic 
Donor Insemination (Ottawa: Health Canada, 2000), s. 2.1(c)(i).  It is 
also unclear whether self-insemination with fresh sperm is prohibited 
under the Act as it currently stands. See Cameron, supra note 67 at n. 
38. 
70  Recent research indicates that children from women led families fare 
as well or better than families where a father is present. See Brewaeys 
et al., supra note 57; Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok, 
“Children Raised in Fatherless Families from Infancy; A Follow Up 
of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers at Early 
Adolescence” (2004) 8 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 
1407. 




Canadian family law is ambiguous about whether the sperm 
donor, once known, will have parenting rights that may be 
exercised contrary to the wishes of the lesbian parents or single 
mother.71 Lesbian couples and single women experience the 
effect of this uncertainty in different ways. For lesbian couples, 
the most challenging aspect of the lack of legal clarity pertains 
to the non-biological or “social” mother. Because in most 
lesbian families72 one of the lesbian parents is not biologically 
related to their child, the concept of “social parent” becomes 
extremely important in these families.73 Biological ties 
typically take a backseat to the shared, everyday experience of 
parenting the child, and the strong parent-child connection that 
results from this shared experience. Uncertainty around the 
legal status of the donor poses a direct threat to lesbian social 
mothers, particularly given that most Canadian provinces only 
permit two legal parents.74 As the discussion of case law below 
indicates, courts have few qualms about inserting a donor into a 
                                                 
71  As compared to lesbian-led families who choose known donors, who 
often enter into parenting agreements, or other legal arrangements, 
prior to the birth of the child. 
72  Unless an egg from one woman partner is fertilised and implanted 
into the other woman partner. 
73  See for instance Nancy J. Mezey, New Choices, New Families: How 
Lesbian Mothers Decide about Motherhood (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 2008); Rachel Epstein ed., Who’s Your Daddy; and 
Other Writing on Queer Parenting (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2009). 
Social parenting refers to a parent-child relationship (which may or 
may not be legally recognised) where there is no shared biology. This 
could be an adoptive parent, a step-parent, a foster parent, etc.: Susan 
Golombok & Clare Murray, “Social versus Biological Parenting: 
Family Functioning and the Socioemotional Development of Children 
Conceived by Egg or Sperm Donation” (1999) 40 J Child Psychol 
Psychia 519. 
74  The one exception is Ontario which has allowed a three parent 
family. It is not clear what precedential value the case has, however, 
given the factual context. See A.A. v. B.B., supra note 64. 
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lesbian family in order to preserve a degree of hetero-
normativity. In the single mother context, the lack of clarity 
around the legal status of donors presents the possibility of 
courts inserting the donor into the single mother household in 
order to create a dyadic nuclear family. 
 
The legal definition of family in Canada has expanded 
in recent years to include legal protections for women-led 
families. For instance, non-biological lesbian mothers can now 
appear on their children’s birth certificates at birth as well as 
enter into second-parent adoptions,75 gays and lesbians can 
marry and divorce,76 and married gays and lesbians may 
therefore be subject to the Divorce Act in making custody and 
access arrangements for their children following the 
termination of an intimate relationship.77 These legal 
definitions of family, however, are deficient in a number of 
important ways that leave lesbian-headed families open to the 
disruption of their family units in ways that heterosexual, dual-
parent families are not. Most notably, and with the exception of 
those living in Quebec and Alberta, lesbian women do not have 
access to presumptions of parentage that apply to heterosexual 
couples who conceive using donor insemination. 
 
                                                 
75  Susan B. Boyd, “Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, 
Intentionality, and Responsibility” (2007) 25 Windsor Y.B. of Access 
to Justice 63 at 75. 
76  See, for example, Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3, s. 2 
(definition of spouse). Marriage and divorce are now equitably 
available as a result of litigation by gay and lesbian couples. See e.g. 
M.M. v. J.H., (2004) 73 O.R. (3d) 337 (S.C.). 
77  Whether the custody and access Divorce Act provisions will apply 
identically to lesbian families remains uncertain. Absent a second-
parent adoption, the parental status of a non-biological mother 
remains uncertain in most provinces. It is therefore possible that 
courts might distinguish between biological and social mothers in the 
context of custody and access decision-making. 




As discussed above, the legal parenting rights and 
responsibilities of sperm donors are not defined or limited by 
law in most provinces.78 Those provinces that have enacted 
legislation in this area have largely chosen to omit lesbian 
mothers from their protection. As a result, lesbian mothers 
remain vulnerable to the legal incursions of donors. While 
second parent adoptions and two mother birth certificates have 
provided non-biological mothers with some degree of legal 
protection, neither adequately meets the immediate post-birth 
needs of lesbian couples. Adoptions cannot be completed until 
the child is six months of age and birth certificates are always 
rebuttable by someone with a “better” typically biological, 
claim to the child. Removing the choice of an anonymous 
donor without appropriate legal reform, risks invalidating 
homo-nuclear, lesbian-led families.79  
 
While lesbian couples have some legal instruments 
available to them, single mothers by choice have virtually no 
legal protection from the intrusion of a donor. In fact, courts 
have been largely unwilling to recognize the right of a woman 
to parent alone and have routinely treated known donors as 
legal fathers.80 Single mothers by choice are thus particularly 
vulnerable if donor anonymity should cease. 
 
Not surprisingly given the lack of legislative guidance, 
jurisprudence in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth 
                                                 
78  Even in provinces where the role of sperm donors is ostensibly 
limited, donors have still been inserted into lesbian-led families 
against the wishes of the lesbian parents. See for instance S.G. v. L.C., 
infra note 84. 
79  Jenni Millbank, “The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian Mother 
Litigation in the Era of the Eternal Biological Family” (2008) 22 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 149 [Millbank]. 
80  See e.g. Johnson-Steeves v. Lee, infra note 102; G.E.S. v. D.L.C., 
infra note 103; Doe v. Alberta, infra note 105. 
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jurisdictions is ambiguous as to the legal status of known 
donors. Below are outlined some of the cases which support the 
false notion that a known sperm donor in a parenting role, or 
contact by a donor, can only be a welcome addition, not an 
intrusion into a lesbian family.81 While all of these cases deal 
with “known” donors, abolishing anonymity may raise similar 
concerns, particularly if applied retroactively.  
 
There are a number of cases where non-biological, 
social lesbian mothers have been denied legal parenting rights 
due to the presence or the actions of a known donor. In all of 
these cases, the known donor had some contact with the child 
in question, but in all cases except one82 the donor was not, in 
our opinion, a social parent by any definition. 
 
As with many aspects of queer parenting and/or 
reproductive technologies and parenting, there is relatively 
little jurisprudence to date, as these family forms, the related 
technologies, and the law continue to develop. However, there 
are four Canadian cases that address the legal status of known 
donors. The first is a 2004 interim decision of the Quebec 
Superior Court, S.G. v. L.C..83 In S.G., the child was conceived 
using the sperm of a known donor who had some limited 
contact with the child in the early months of her life. However, 
after the mothers began limiting the contact between the donor 
and child, the donor sought an order of filiation, arguing that a 
“parental project”, as defined by article 538 of the Quebec Civil 
Code, existed between himself and the biological mother.84 The 
court responded by characterizing the biological lesbian mother 
as being in a “parental project” with a known sperm donor to 
                                                 
81  For more on this topic see Millbank, supra note 79.  
82  M.A.C. v.  M.K., infra note 91. 
83  [2004] R.D.F. 517 (Sup Ct).  
84  Art. 538 C.C.Q.  




the exclusion of her partner, the non-biological, social lesbian 
mother. The court awarded thrice weekly access to the then 
nine month old child against the wishes of the lesbian parents. 
This was in spite of the fact that the lesbian couple had entered 
into a registered civil union, and both appeared as parents on 
the child’s birth registration. The court awarded the donor 
parental status in part because he has been in a year long dating 
relationship with the biological mother more than a decade 
before the insemination, after which they continued to be 
friends.85 The judge also appeared to discount both the 
legislative regime and the parental relationship that develop 
between the non-biological mother and child. For example, the 
judge alleged that the parental relationship was being “created 
artificially”86 and framed the mothers’ attitude as “totally 
destructive” because they were denying the child her “rights to 
her father”.87  
 
The second Quebec paternity case involving sperm 
donation by a known donor to a lesbian couple, L.O. v. S.J.,88 
produced a different result. Given the clarity of the factual 
evidence in L.O., the Quebec Superior Court had little choice 
                                                 
85  A similar, more recent Quebec case refused to grant a known donor 
parental status under the same legal regime. See A v. B., X and C 
[2007] J.Q. No. 1895. Family law in Quebec is unique in a number of 
important ways that effect outcomes in these cases. In particular, laws 
of filiation and legislation dealing specifically with the status of 
sperm donors should more closely control outcomes in cases 
involving sperm donors and lesbian mothers. See Mario Provost, « La 
procréation médicalement assistée » Droit de la famille québécois, 
Montréal, CCH, vol. 1 50- 215 and Renée Joyal et Mario Provost, 
Précis de droit des jeunes, 3e édition : Le droit civil de l’enfance et de 
l’adolescence (Québec: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1999). 
86  Supra note 84 at para 50. 
87  Ibid. at para 54. 
88  (2006) J.Q. No. 450 (Sup. Ct.). 
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but to follow the clear instruction of the filiation provisions in 
the Civil Code. The parties had a donor agreement that 
specified that the donor agreed to relinquish all rights he may 
have as a legal parent. The court relied on the agreement as 
written confirmation of the intention of the parties with regard 
to the “parental project”. In addition, the court relied on the fact 
that the women already had two children conceived using the 
sperm of a different donor to support the assertion that the 
donor was not intended to be part of the parenting arrangement. 
Based on these facts, the court held that the parties to the 
“parental project” were the two women and that the donor was 
a third party gamete provider. For this reason, the donor was 
excluded from the status of father on the basis of article 538.2. 
By way of counter argument, the donor asserted that the 
parental project involved three individuals – himself and the 
two mothers – but the court rejected the claim because Quebec 
law does not permit three legal parents. The decision in L.O. 
suggests that sperm donors will not always be successful in 
asserting paternity. However, the clarity of the facts and the 
clear legislative statement on the issue left the court with little 
choice but to make the decision it did. By contrast, the lack of 
factual clarity in S.G. meant that the court had far greater 
freedom to make a decision based on the desire for a normative 
family arrangement. 
 
The next case is a Quebec Court of Appeal decision, A 
v. B, C and X.89 Again, in this case, the court characterized a 
biological lesbian mother as being party to a “parental project” 
with a known sperm donor to the exclusion of her former 
partner, the non-biological, social lesbian mother. According to 
the court, despite having had virtually no contact with the 
child, and openly acknowledging his role as a donor and not 
father, the donor was designated a “father” because the child 
                                                 
89  A v. B, C and X 2007 R.D.F. 217. 




had been conceived via intercourse.90 The lesbian co-mother, 
despite having actively parented the child since birth, was not 
granted parental rights. 
 
The fourth case is a 2009 Ontario Court of Justice case, 
M.A.C. v. M.K (“M.A.C.”).91 In this case, a non-biological 
lesbian mother’s application to be recognized as a legal parent 
through second-parent adoption was denied based on the 
refusal of the known donor to provide consent. Unlike the 
Quebec cases, the donor had significant parenting involvement 
in the life of the child. He had earlier been awarded continued 
interim access against the wishes of the lesbian co-mothers.92 
Because of his involvement in the life of the child, he was 
granted parental rights. While this may have been an 
appropriate response to the donor’s significant involvement, 
the effect of the decision was to negate the parental relationship 
between the non-biological mother and child.  
 
M.A.C. can be contrasted with the final case, Re: 
SSM,93 where lesbian co-mothers were granted a joint adoption 
despite the presence of a known donor. However, in Re: SSM 
the known donor consented to the adoption and the lesbian co-
mothers were actively fostering a relationship with him through 
regular access to the child.  In other words, the donor’s status 
as “father” was not threatened by the adoption. 
 
                                                 
90  Without the knowledge of the non-biological lesbian co-mother, the 
child was conceived through intercourse rather than insemination 
during her relationship with the biological mother. 
91  M.A.C. v. M.K. 2009 ONCJ 18. The couple had previously been 
denied an adoption despite the consent (at that time) of the known 
donor due to his involvement in the child’s life. 
92  K. (M.) v. C. (M.) and D.(C.), 2007 ONCJ 456. 
93    Re: SSM [2007] O.J. No. 4290 (Ont. Ct. Just.). 
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Cases in other jurisdictions point to similar trends. For 
example, in the Australian case of Re Patrick, a donor who had 
limited contact with a child was awarded generous access and 
characterized as a “father” against the wishes of the lesbian co-
mothers.94 Similarly, in the U.S. case of Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 
95 a minimally involved known sperm donor was granted 
parental status and extensive parenting rights against the 
wishes of both lesbian mothers. Finally, in the Scottish case of 
X and Y,96 the court characterized the lesbian co-mothers’ 
behavior in resisting a known donor’s insertion into their 
family as “selfish, non-child centred and weird….”97 
Ultimately, the known donor was awarded a parenting order 
against the wishes of the lesbian co-mothers.98 
 
Finally, the 2004 New Zealand case of P v. K and M99 
amply illustrates the reasons Canadian lesbian-led, homo-
nuclear families may be apprehensive regarding de-
anonymising donors. In this case, even in the presence of 
legislation that severed the parental status of gamete donors, a 
                                                 
94  Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096. For a discussion of this case see 
Fiona Kelly, “Redefining Parenthood: Gay and Lesbian Families in 
the Family Court – The Case of Re Patrick” (2002) 16 Australian 
Journal of Family Law 204. 
95  Thomas S. v. Robin Y 618 NYS2d 356 (1994); 599 NYS2d 377 
(1995). 
96  X and Y (2002) SLT (Sh. Ct.) 161. 
97  Millbank, supra note 79 at 162. 
98  Leanne Bell, “Is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
Compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?” 
[2009] 1 Web J. of Current Legal Issues at 20. 
99  There have now been six judgments in this case. K. v. M, (2002) 22 
F.R.N.Z. 360; P. v. K. & M., (Fam. Ct. N.Z.), [Unreported, Doogue J, 
8 August 2002]; P v. K [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 787; P. v. K. & M. [2004] 
N.Z.F.L.R. 752; P. v. K. [2004] 2 N.Z.L.R. 421; P. v. K. [2006] 
N.Z.F.L.R. 22. 




relatively uninvolved, known sperm donor was granted three-
day weekends every second weekend, and half of all school 
holidays to foster what the court referred to as a “father and 
son” relationship. This extensive access was granted over the 
objection of the lesbian co-mothers, and despite a pre-
conception agreement indicating that the donor would have no 
formal parenting rights whatsoever.100 
 
Single mothers by choice who use anonymous donors 
to conceive children face similar issues. As women-headed 
families, they run the risk of having a donor inserted as a 
“father” or “father figure” into their family of choice, 
particularly given the absence of a second parent and thus the 
option of entering into a second parent adoption. As with 
homo-nuclear lesbian families, the Canadian jurisprudence 
illustrates a trend towards finding “fathers” for these women-
led families. For instance, in the 1997 Alberta Court of Appeal 
decision Johnston-Steeves v. Lee,101 a man who the mother 
characterized as a known sperm donor, but who saw himself as 
a “father,” was granted extensive access to the child against the 
wishes of a single mother by choice. Similarly in G.E.S. v. 
D.L.C.,102 a decision that was ultimately overturned on 
appeal,103 a platonic male friend of a single mother by choice, 
who was not the donor for insemination, was granted access to 
the children in question. Finally, in Doe v. Alberta,104 a single 
mother by choice was inseminated with donor sperm. She was 
in an intimate relationship with a male partner, but the parties 
had agreed that he would not be a parent to the child. The 
mother and her partner sought a joint declaration that he was 
                                                 
100  Millbank, supra note 79 at 162. 
101  [1997] A.J. No. 512. 
102  [2005] S.J. No. 354. 
103  [2006] S.J. No. 419. 
104  [2005] A.J. No. 1719. 
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not a “father”, and had no rights and obligations in relation to 
her child. The application was denied by the court, which 
asserted that such a man could not help but become a “father” 
given that he was living with the child.  
 
Given the existing jurisprudence, homo-nuclear 
lesbian-headed families, as well as single mothers by choice, 
face significant risks if donor anonymity is abolished without 
first ensuring that their families are legally and socially 
protected from the unwanted intrusion of a third party. 
Women-headed families currently have the ability to choose a 
known donor, and the non-nuclear possibilities that entails, 
including the risk of conflict within an “extra parent” family. 
However, for those families who have chosen anonymous 
donors it is precisely to avoid the legal ambiguity, and 
unwanted shared parenting that can come with a known donor. 




Heterosexual families have quite different concerns about de-
anonymizing sperm donation.  First and foremost, unlike 
women-headed families, secrecy about the use of donated 
sperm is longstanding and continues to occur in heterosexual 
families.  Although there is a trend towards disclosure, recent 
studies demonstrate that a number of heterosexual parents wish 
to keep the manner of conception and the use of donated sperm 
secret.105 In contrast, women-headed families generally inform 
the offspring about the use of a sperm donor from a young 
age.106 Women-headed families do so in the context of 
explaining their chosen family form to their offspring.107  
 
                                                 
105  Lalos, Gottlieb & Lalos , supra note 45 at 1760. 
106  Brewaeys et al., supra note 57 at 1357. 
107  Ibid. 




The secrecy surrounding the use of donor sperm by 
heterosexual families, rightly or wrongly, is driven by a 
number of factors. First, heterosexual families are concerned 
that disclosure will negatively affect the offspring.108  Second, 
male partners or social fathers are concerned about disclosing 
the use of donated sperm because they do not want others to 
learn they are infertile.109 Third, heterosexual parents worry 
about the impact of disclosure on family bonds, especially 
between child and father. There is a fear, especially among 
social fathers, that the offspring will reject the social father on 
the basis that he is not the offspring’s “real” or biological 
father.110  
 
Abolishing donor anonymity diminishes the 
heterosexual parents’ opportunity to keep the use of donated 
sperm secret. Even in the absence of a mandatory duty to 
disclose the use of donated gametes to the offspring, the 
abolishment of donor anonymity greatly increases the 
likelihood that the offspring will learn of the method of his or 
her conception later in life. Thus, many heterosexual families 
have also expressed some reluctance regarding de-
anonymisation of sperm donors and have advocated for certain 
protections, such as delaying disclosure until the offspring 
reaches the age of majority.  
 
Rights and Interests of the Donor  
 
The third stakeholder in the debate around donor anonymity is 
the donors themselves.  The nature of the donor’s rights and 
interests vary depending on whether we are referring to 
prospective donors or men who have already donated sperm 
under the anonymous regime. There is no right to donor 
                                                 
108  Lalos, Gottlieb & Lalos, supra note 45 at 1766. 
109  Ibid.  
110  Ibid. 
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anonymity per se. Rather, the donor’s right to remain 
anonymous is a “constructed right”, that is, it is either created 
by contract or created by law.111 In Canada, the right to donor 
anonymity is created by virtue of the AHRA. Thus, if the AHRA 
were amended to require compulsory identity release sperm 
donors, a prospective donor would not enjoy the right to be an 
anonymous donor.  
 
However, an individual who has donated sperm under 
the anonymous regime may have a personal interest in either 
the maintenance of donor anonymity or in de-anonymising 
donation. However, in all Canadian jurisdictions at the time the 
sperm was donated, the donor had a reasonable expectation that 
his identity would not be revealed. This reasonable expectation 
of privacy may be protected by section 7 of the Charter. As a 
result, any legislation that seeks to open previously confidential 
records regarding the donor or provide identifying information 
about donors or offspring requires balancing mechanisms to 
protect these section 7 rights as against any claims made by 
donor conceived offspring. 
 
In the context of adoption, which is arguably 
analogous, the Ontario Superior Court in Cheskes held that 
birth parents and adoptees enjoyed a reasonable expectation 
that their identity would remain private.112 The impugned 
adoption legislation, the Adoption Information Disclosure Act 
(“AIDA”),113 authorized the disclosure of identifying 
information except where an individual had established that 
they were entitled to a non-disclosure order on the basis that 
                                                 
111  Lisa Shields, “Consistency and Privacy: Do These Legal Principles 
Mandate Gamete Donor Anonymity” (2003) 12 Health L. Rev. 39 at 
para. 15.  
112  Cheskes v. Ontario, [2008] O.J. No. 3515 [Cheskes]. 
113  S.O. 2005, c. 25 [AIDA]. The AIDA amended the Vital Statistics Act, 
supra note 3. 




there were exceptional circumstances to prevent sexual harm or 
significant physical or emotional harm to the adopted person or 
birth parent.114 In addition, adopted persons and birth parents 
could file a no-contact notice.115 The court concluded that the 
disclosure of birth and adoption records under these 
circumstances was found to violate their right to privacy which 
was an essential aspect of their right to liberty in a free and 
democratic society. The court held that disclosure of 
identifying information was inconsistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice: the reasonable expectation that their 
private and confidential information would not be disclosed to 
third parties without their consent.116  
 
Interests of Prospective Parents  
 
The stakeholders whose interests most often dominate the 
debate about the abolition of donor anonymity sperm donation 
are “would-be” or prospective parents. The principal concern 
of prospective parents is that de-anonymisation will 
significantly reduce sperm supply and will result in significant 
delays, inappropriate donors or unsafe use of ARTs. It is 
argued that with the cloak of secrecy removed, men will no 
longer be willing to donate sperm.117 This shortage impacts the 
reproductive autonomy of those who wish to use donor sperm 
and may threaten the health and safety of those who seek to use 
donated sperm. 
 
A decrease in sperm supply immediately following de-
anonymisation appears to have occurred in certain jurisdictions 
                                                 
114  AIDA, ibid., ss. 48.5 and 48.7. 
115  Ibid., ss. 48.4 and 56.1 
116  Cheskes, supra note 112 at para. 132.  
117  This concern was foremost in the mind of the Baird Commission 
discussed above.  
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where complete donor anonymity has been removed.118  Some 
studies have indicated that sperm donations eventually 
rebound.119  However, more research is required to determine 
the true impact of de-anonymisation on supply.  
 
What are the consequences of a sperm donor shortage? 
The most obvious consequence is significant delays for 
prospective parent(s) who require donated sperm.120 In 
addition, a shortage of sperm may make it difficult for 
prospective parents to find an appropriate donor. For example, 
with fewer donors it is more difficult to find a donor who 
shares personal characteristics of the parent(s).121 This is 
already a problem for racialized individuals who seek a donor 
who shares their racial background. The donor may also be 
inappropriate because of age. As mentioned, the de-
anonymisation of sperm donation often results in a shift in the 
donor profile in favour of older men who already have families 
of their own. Although this is a positive development in several 
                                                 
118  For example, in Sweden, there was an initial decline in sperm 
donation following the removal of donor anonymity in 1984:  A. 
Lalos, et al. “Recruitment and Motivation of Semen Providers in 
Sweden” (2003) 18 Human Reproduction 212 at 212 [Lalos]. In the 
United Kingdom, there is a perception that the removal of donor 
anonymity has resulted in a shortage of sperm: Turkmendag, supra 
note 39 at 296. 
119  For example, in Sweden, donations eventually rose with the 
subsequent increase being attributed to a shift in recruitment methods, 
and a shift in the donor profile to older men: Lalos, ibid.  at 212. 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, recent reports from Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority indicate that the number of 
sperm donors is increasing once again: “Number of Sperm Donors 
Up Following Anonymity Law Changes” Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (3 May 2007), online: Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/465.html>. 
120  Turkmendag, supra note 39. 
121  Ibid.  at 295. 




respects, it is negative from a clinical perspective as sperm 
from older men tend to be of lower quality and as a result are 
less able to fertilize the ova.122 Notably, these donors tend to be 
motivated by procreation and are more likely to want a 
relationship with their offspring, which could result in the 
unwanted intrusion of the donor on the family unit, which as 
we have discussed, is a particularly acute concern for women-
led families.123 
 
Further, a shortage of sperm donors may result in 
prospective parents seeking sperm outside the licensed system. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, a fresh sperm market has 
developed on the Internet, often with unscreened sperm.124 The 
use of fresh unscreened sperm may put women at risk as there 
are no guarantees that the donor sperm were subjected to 
rigorous testing for quality and disease, such as chlamydia or 
HIV.125 Further, the legal parentage laws only apply where the 
sperm is acquired through a licensed facility. A shortage of 
sperm donors may also result in “reproductive tourism”, in 
other words, prospective parents go abroad for fertility 
                                                 
122  Ibid.  at 288.   
123  Kate M. Godman, et al., “Potential Sperm Donors’, Recipients’ and 
Their Partners’ Opinions Towards the Release of Identifying 
Information in Western Australia” (2006) 21 Human Reproduction 
3022 at 3026.  
124  Turkmendag, supra note 39 at 284. The UK authorities recently 
charged two men for not having a valid license to broker the sale of 
“fresh” sperm from anonymous donors: MacKenna Roberts, 
“Directors of Online Sperm Donor Business Face Criminal 
Prosecution” BioNews (8 June 2009), online: BioNews <http:// 
www.bionews.org.uk/new.lasso?storyid=4392>. 
125  “FAQs about Treatment” Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, online: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2567.html >. 
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treatment, which of course also exposes prospective parent(s) 
to additional risks.126   
 
WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
 
Given the often disparate rights and interests of donors, the 
donor-conceived and intending parents, creating a legal regime 
palatable to everyone is not an easy task. Perhaps one of the 
most appropriate responses is to consider comparable legal 
dilemmas, such as that presented by adoption, as well as 




A brief consideration of how adoption law has dealt with issues 
of anonymity may provide some useful guidance in 
formulating policies and legislation on donor anonymity in the 
context of ARTs. The adoption model is apt as at least one 
biological parent whose identity was historically unknown is 
absent from the family unit. In response to some of the same 
concerns around health and identity-formation, some Canadian 
provinces amended their legislation to permit two new 
mechanisms by which children can have access to their 
biological progenitors. The first is open adoption, whereby the 
adoptive parents and the biological parents or other biological 
family members agree to an ongoing relationship. Open 
adoption agreements are typically made while the adoptee is 
                                                 
126  “Thinking of Going Abroad? Think Twice about Going Abroad for 
Fertility Treatment” Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
(27 April 2006), online: Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/623.html>. Notably, the website 
which Turkmendag et al. were studying was closed by the HFEA for 
a period of time because they were concerned about the increasing 
number of postings about offshore facilities that offered reproductive 
services using anonymous gametes: Turkmendag, supra note 39 at 
294.   




still a child. The second, which is perhaps most applicable to 
the donor conception context, is adoption record disclosure 
which gives the adoptee access to his or her biological parents’ 
identities once the child reaches the age of majority. In our 
view, the new disclosure mechanisms provide useful guidance 
on how to regulate the disclosure of the donor’s identity and 
the safeguards required to protect donor-conceived offspring, 
social parents and the donor. In the context of adoption, 
disclosure has been embraced in several provinces. We will 
focus on two examples, British Columbia and Ontario, both of 
which permit disclosure but also provide appropriate protective 
mechanisms, such as disclosure vetoes.  
 
British Columbia’s Adoption Act establishes a 
disclosure regime that is applicable once the child reaches the 
age of majority.127 For all adoptions taking place after the 
coming into force of the Adoption Act, the director may 
disclose to any adult, who, as a child was adopted, any 
information in the adoption record.128 The regulations to the 
Adoption Act set out a number of requirements in terms of the 
collection of information.  
 
Similarly, on May 14, 2008, the Ontario government 
enacted legislation, the Access to Adoptions Records Act, 2008 
which permits the opening of past and future adoption records 
in Ontario.129 This legislation authorized adult adoptees and 
birth parents to access adoption records which would allow 
them to contact their birth parents or biological children 
                                                 
127  Supra note 3.  
128  Ibid., s. 56.  
129  An Act to Amend the Vital Statistics Act in Relation to Adoption 
Information and to make Consequential Amendments to the Child and 
Family Services Act, S.O. 2008, c. 5 [Act to Amend]. 
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respectively.130 The first version of the act, the AIDA involved 
a more robust system of identification with few protections for 
those who did not want their records to be made retroactively 
available. However, as discussed above, the act was struck 
down by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Cheskes.131 
The new version includes a number of mechanisms that protect 
those who do not want their identities to be revealed 
retroactively.  
 
While both the British Columbia and Ontario 
legislation permits disclosure of information to adult adoptees, 
both acts include several protective mechanisms that limit the 
effect of disclosure. In British Columbia, both an adult adopted 
person and a birth parent may file a disclosure veto which 
precludes the disclosure of any information in a record that 
relates to the person who filed the veto.132 In addition, both a 
birth parent and an adult adopted child may file a no-contact 
declaration.133 Where a no-contact declaration has been 
executed, a person applying to see a copy of a birth registration 
or other record must sign an undertaking stating that they will 
not knowingly contact or attempt to contact the person who 
filed the declaration, procure another person to contact the 
person who filed the declaration, use information obtained 
under the Adoption Act  to intimidate or harass the person who 
filed the declaration, or procure another person to intimidate or 
                                                 
130  The type of information typically found in adoption orders and birth 
registrations may include the child’s birth name, the name of the 
child’s mother, the name of the child’s father, and the name of the 
hospital where the baby was born, online: Minister of Community 
and Social Services - Adoption Information <http://www.mcss.gov. 
on.ca>. 
131  Supra note 112. 
132  Adoption Act, supra note 3, s. 65. 
133  Ibid., s. 66.  




harass the person who filed the declaration, using information 
obtained under the Adoption Act. 
  
As noted above, in Ontario, the act preceding the 
ultimate legislation, the AIDA, sought to establish a more open 
system in adoption by requiring that adoption records be 
retroactively opened without the consent and even contrary to 
the wishes of the adult adoptee or the birth parent. The revised 
version, in the form of amendments to the Vital Statistics Act, 
offers two mechanisms to protect the privacy interests of 
adoptees and birth parents for adoptions occurring prior to 
September 1, 2008. First, either the adoptee or a birth parent 
may register a disclosure veto which prevents the disclosure of 
any information relating to the adoption.134 A disclosure veto 
must be filed by June 1, 2009. Second, the adoptee or the birth 
parent may execute a no-contact notice.135  
 
The adoption models in British Columbia and Ontario 
provide some guidance as to how donor anonymity might be 
dealt with. In particular, the availability of no-contact and non-
disclosure orders have the potential to protect those for whom 
de-anonymisation is unwanted. 
 
The UK:  Open Donation and Assisted Human 
Reproduction  
 
Numerous jurisdictions have already grappled with the issue of 
donor anonymity and thus provide models for how the dilemma 
might be dealt with in Canada.136 For example, the United 
                                                 
134  Act to Amend, supra note 129, ss. 48.1 and 48.2.  
135  Ibid., s. 48.4.  
136  Eric Blyth & Lucy Frith, “Donor Conceived People’s Access to 
Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of Different 
Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting Disclosure of Donor 
Identity” (2009) 23 International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 174. 
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Kingdom recently revised the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (“HFEA”) to provide for open donation 
of sperm and embryos.137 Previously, the legislation preserved 
donor anonymity, but required that a register of identifiable 
individuals be kept for a number of purposes, including the 
disclosure of non-identifying information to the donor-
conceived offspring.138 The new provisions followed public 
consultations with various stakeholders139 as well as a legal 
decision concerning the applicability of Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the 
right to respect for private and family life, to donor 
anonymity.140 Though it ultimately refused to find a violation 
of Article 8,141 the court held that:  
 
[r]espect for private and family life requires that 
everyone should be able to establish details of 
their identity as individual human beings. This 
includes their origins and the opportunity to 
understand them. It also embraces their physical 
and social identity and psychological 
integrity.142 
 
Responding to concerns about the rights of donor conceived 
offspring, the new legislation abolished donor anonymity, 
                                                 
137  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (U.K.), 1990, c. 37 
[HFEA]. 
138  Ibid., s. 31. 
139  For a discussion on the consultation process, see Turkmendag, supra 
note 40. 
140  R (on application of Rose) v. Secretary of State for Health, [2002] 
EWHC 1593. It is important to note that the purpose of the litigation 
was not to achieve compulsory disclosure of the identity of donors.  
141  Ibid. at para. 46.  
142  Ibid. at para 45.  




replacing it with a system that permits a donor conceived 
person over the age of 18 to have access to information about 
their donor's appearance, as well as the name, date, place of 
birth and last known address of the donor.143 Notably, the 
regulation is not retroactive.144 Thus, donor conceived 
offspring who were born prior to the coming into force of the 
legislation, April 1, 2005, are not authorized under the 
legislation to access the identity of their donors.145  However, 
offspring who were born prior to the legislation coming into 
force and are over age 18, or are over age 16 with the intention 
of marrying, can ask the licensing authority to establish 
whether he or she might have been born as a result of ARTs 
and, if so, to advise whether the person whom the applicant 
proposed to marry is related.146 
 
To address the absence of retroactivity, the UK’s 
Department of Health established the UK DonorLink.147 This 
was a voluntary contact register established to enable people 
conceived through donated sperm and/or eggs, their donors and 
half-siblings to exchange information and, where desired, to 
contact each other if they mutually consent. The register is 
available to individuals over the age of 18 conceived using 
donated sperm or eggs, or who donated in the UK before the 
HFEA came into force in August 1991. 
 
Though not directly in response to the abolition of 
donor anonymity, the United Kingdom has also enacted 
                                                 
143  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor 
Information) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/1511). 
144  HFEA, supra note 138, s. 31(5). 
145  Ibid.  
146  Ibid., s. 31(3). 
147 For more information on UK DonorLink, see <http://www.ukdonor 
link.org.uk/default.asp>. 
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legislation governing parental status where assisted human 
reproductive technologies have been used. Initially, the 
changes applied only to heterosexual couples. For example, 
section 28(2) of the HFEA provides that where a woman is 
married and she has been inseminated with the sperm of 
another man, provided that her husband has consented, he will 
be treated as the legal father of the child.148 However, s. 28(3) 
limits the presumption of paternity to situations where the 
insemination is carried out in a licensed clinic and where the 
parties are seeking the treatment “together”.149 This provision 
is meant to ensure legal paternity of the child born to a woman 
and her bona fide partner as a result of using donor sperm only 
where the procedure is carried out in a licensed facility. The 
presumption would not apply if the donor provided a specimen 
to an unmarried couple, an unlicensed practitioner, or where 
insemination occured outside of a licensed facility. In 2008, 
amendments to the HFEA incorporated lesbian couples who 
have entered into a civil union into the Act’s provisions. If two 
women are party to a civil partnership and both consent to the 
treatment, the birth mother’s female partner will be treated as 
the child’s second legal parent.150 These changes created rules 
of presumptive parenthood for lesbian non-biological mothers 
and permitted them to be named on the child’s birth certificate.  
 
Though not the only model available, the UK reforms 
seek to balance the needs of the various stakeholders in the 
donor anonymity debate. While respecting the donor 
offspring’s right to know his or her genetic origins, it also 
respects the privacy rights of those who supplied and used 
sperm at a time when complete anonymity was guaranteed. 
Significantly, it also clarifies the legal status of donors and 
social parents, at least where the procedure is carried out in a 
                                                 
148  Supra note 13, s. 28(2). 
149  Ibid., s. 28(3) 
150  Ibid., ss. 42-47. 




licensed facility, thus protecting both heterosexual and lesbian 
families from the legal claims of donors, and donors from the 
legal claims of intending parents. The only group omitted from 
the changes is single mothers by choice who cannot rely on the 
existence of a second parent to offset the claim of a donor. 
 
CONCLUSION:  CANADIAN LAW REFORM 
 
Due to the unique vulnerabilities of women-led families 
identified above, we recommend that donor anonymity be 
abolished only after sufficient legal protection for women-led 
families, and particularly lesbian social mothers and single 
mothers by choice, exists. Accordingly, we recommend that 
before the AHRA is amended, the legal status of donors and 
social parents be clearly set out in provincial family laws. The 
UK model provides an example of how that might be achieved. 
In addition, the AHRA itself should be amended to include a 
number of veto and non-disclosure provisions, similar to those 
applied in the adoption context. Such provisions would be 
particularly vital if any form of retroactivity were to be 
introduced.  
 
Amendments to the AHRA 
 
We recommend that donor anonymity be excised from the 
AHRA. Completely anonymous sperm donation would be 
abolished. However, several restrictions are necessary to 
protect the best interests of the child, the integrity of the family 
unit and the interests of donors. First, contact between the 
donor and the offspring must be prohibited until the offspring 
reaches the age of majority. This is essential to preserve the 
integrity of the social family unit whether it is a single-mother 
by choice, lesbian-led, or heterosexual family. 
 
Second, prior to the age of majority the offspring 
should have access to certain non-identifying information about 
his or her donor that will be located in a health registry. This 
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information may include basic personal characteristics and 
regularly updated medical information. The offspring may have 
access to additional information which the donor has 
voluntarily provided. The AHRA currently creates a personal 
health information registry for identifying and non-identifying 
information of individuals who have donated reproductive 
materials, persons who have undergone ARTs and individuals 
conceived using ARTs. The Assisted Human Reproduction 
Agency of Canada will be responsible for the registry. The 
nature and scope of the information to be included in the 
registry has been left to the regulations, which are not yet 
drafted. We recommend that a catch-all approach to 
information collection, use and disclosure be avoided and that 
only information that is necessary to the physical and 
psychological well-being of the persons involved in ARTs be 
subject to the AHRA.151 This can be ascertained through 
consultation with donor-conceived offspring, social parents, 
donors, physicians, legislators, and the Canadian public.  
 
Third, the offspring, upon reaching the age of majority 
or becoming sexually active, whichever occurs first, should be 
entitled, with their potential sexual partner to make an 
application to determine if either one or both of them were 
conceived using ARTs and whether they are related. Based on 
their application, the Agency will disclose to them whether 
there is information in the registry indicating that they are 
genetically related and, if so, the nature of the relationship.152  
 
We also recommend that a mechanism be included in 
the AHRA to allow those who were conceived through 
anonymous donation and have reached the age of majority and 
those who donated sperm anonymously to learn the identities 
of their donors and offspring, should both parties consent. This 
                                                 
151  Gruben, supra note 43. 
152   AHRA, supra note 7, s. 18(4).  




could be accomplished in two ways. A voluntary donor registry 
could be established as has been done in the UK. This registry 
would allow donor-conceived offspring, their donors and half-
siblings to exchange information and to contact one another, if 
desired. The registry would be strictly voluntary. Alternatively, 
the AHRA could establish a system similar to that pertaining to 
adoption in Ontario and British Columbia. Such a system 
would allow offspring and their donors to receive identifying 
information about each other once the child has reached the age 
of majority, unless either filed a disclosure veto or executed a 
no-contact declaration.  
 
Amendments to Provincial Family Laws   
 
Family law reform is also necessary in order to address the 
equity concerns raised by de-anonymising sperm donation for 
women-led families.153 The main issue to be addressed is legal 
parentage in the context of assisted conception, which is 
primarily a provincial concern. Because of the unique legal 
vulnerabilities women-led families’ experience in the context 
of legal parentage, it is imperative that each province reform its 
parentage laws before anonymous sperm donation is abolished.  
 
As discussed above, lesbian and single mothers face 
significant legal vulnerabilities when it comes to provincial 
parentage laws. With the exception of those living in Quebec 
and Alberta, lesbian couples do not have access to the 
parentage presumptions that apply to heterosexual couples who 
conceive via donor insemination. As a result, non-biological 
                                                 
153  A comprehensive model for reform in this area has been provided by 
Fiona Kelly as a result of her empirical research into lesbian families 
in Canada. See “(Re)forming Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal 
Parentage Within Planned Lesbian Families” 40 Ottawa L. Rev. 
[Forthcoming in 2009] [Kelly]. See also: Robert Leckey, “Where the 
Parents are of the Same Sex: Quebec’s Reforms to Filiation” (2009) 
23 International J of Law, Policy & the Family 52. 
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lesbian mothers have no automatic legal rights to their children. 
In order to rectify this situation, non-biological lesbian mothers 
must take positive steps to secure legal parentage, typically via 
a second parent adoption. However, second parent adoption 
relies on the consent of the child’s biological parents, including 
a known donor, cannot be completed until the child is six 
months old and generally requires legal assistance. By contrast, 
parentage presumptions apply at birth, do not require any form 
of consent, and treat non-biological parents identically to 
biological parents. While two-mother birth certificates, now 
available in many provinces, have alleviated some of the stress 
of securing a second parent adoption, a birth certificate is a 
rebuttable document. Only an adoption can sever the rights, if 
any, of a donor and vest in the non-biological mother 
irrebutable parental rights.  
 
Single mothers by choice would arguably be even 
more vulnerable if sperm donation were to be anonymized. 
When there is only one parent, legal mechanisms such as a 
second parent adoption or a gender neutral birth certificate are 
of no use, leaving a single mother with no way in which to 
assert her sole legal parentage. Quebec is the only province to 
address legal parentage in the context of single mothers by 
choice and does so by securing the mother's sole parentage and 
severing the rights and responsibilities, if any, of a donor. 
Absent such a law, the abolition of donor anonymity would 
likely pose a significant threat to single mothers who have no 
way of legally asserting their desire to parent alone.  
 
Given the existing vulnerabilities women-led families 
experience in the context of legal parentage, a number of 
reforms should be made to provincial parentage laws. First, the 
legal status of sperm donors, if any, should be addressed by the 
provinces. We recommend an approach similar to that taken in 
Quebec, given that it is the only province to address parentage 




in the context of both lesbian couples and single women.154 The 
key features of such a legislative regime are as follows. First, it 
is necessary to clarify that a donor to a heterosexual couple, a 
same-sex couple, or a single woman is not a legal parent, 
whether conception occurs at a fertility clinic or via home 
insemination. Second, it is necessary to presumptively establish 
that any partner of the birth mother, whether male or female 
and in the event that he or she has consented to the conception, 
is the child’s other legal parent. In the absence of a partner, the 
biological mother must be presumed to be the child’s sole legal 
parent. Finally, in the rare cases where couples or single 
women enter into a parenting agreement with their donor which 
specifies that he is to play a parental role, such an agreement 
should be respected by the court.155 Because courts are 
generally unwilling to permit parents to “contract” about their 
children, it would be optimal if such agreements could be filed 
with the court and thus turned into court orders.156 
Alternatively, provinces could develop some sort of legislative 
“opt-in” framework that would enable a donor, with the 
consent of the presumptive parents and within a year of the 
child’s birth, to opt-in to the status of legal parent.157 
 
Absent changes to provincial parentage laws, the de-
anonymisation of sperm donation poses a significant risk to 
                                                 
154  Art. 538 C.C.Q. Similar legislation has also been recently passed in 
Victoria, Australia: Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic.), 
Part III. The Victorian legislation addresses parentage in relation to 
women “with a female partner” and women “without a partner”. 
155  An example of such a scenario is the Ontario decision of A. A. v. B. B. 
in which the court permitted the child, upon application by a lesbian 
couple and their donor, to have three legal parents: A.A. v B.B., supra 
note 63. 
156  This is the approach taken in New Zealand. See Care of Children Act 
(N.Z.), 2004/090, s. 41. 
157  Such a recommendation was made by Kelly, supra note 153. 
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women-led families. Already vulnerable to the legal incursions 
of known donors, de-anonymisation would only add to the 
legal uncertainty. It is therefore imperative that reforms to 
provincial parentage laws be understood as a necessary element 
of any changes to the rules regarding donor anonymity. 
 
 
 
